Nato what does

On one side of the debate stands the United States, which, as a global power with global interests, argues that NATO should be the instrument of choice to deal with threats to the common interests of its members, wherever these threats arise.

At the same time, U. Our nations share global interests that require us to work together to the same degree of solidarity that we have long maintained on this continent.

Europe today is at relative peace. For the first time in a century, European stability is not threatened by a major power—be it a revisionist Germany or an expansionist Russia. At the same time, instability and threats to real, if not vital, interests do exist outside of Europe.

These include WMD proliferation, terrorism, disruption of energy supplies, and challenges to the balance of power in critical regions like southwest and northeast Asia.

Second, if threats outside Europe pose the most immediate challenge to the shared interests of the NATO countries, the Alliance combines countries that are the most capable of dealing with these types of threats. For most European allies—including even those, like Britain and France, whose interests extend well beyond Europe—the Atlantic Alliance remains a quintessential European security organization, whose fundamental purpose is to provide security in and for Europe. The debate among them is not whether the Alliance should have a role beyond Europe, but rather how far beyond allied territory its role should extend.

This is particularly true in the Middle East, where U. It is also true regarding a threat that many regard as the preeminent post-cold war challenge to NATO—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas Secretary Albright has argued that WMD proliferation constitutes as much of a unifying threat to the Alliance as the Soviet threat of yesteryear, most European allies neither perceive it as an immediate threat to Europe nor regard NATO as the primary instrument for effectively dealing with the WMD threat.

International treaties and organizations, including the United Nations, as well as more ad-hoc supplier regimes are generally regarded as the preferred instruments for addressing proliferation. In contrast to the U. The same might be said of other challenges to common interests outside Europe. This is consistent with the original intent of the Alliance, which, as expressed in Article 10 of the Washington treaty, limited consideration of future membership to European states.

Moreover, under the UN Charter, the Atlantic Alliance operates as a regional rather than a global organization. At the same time, they should do nothing that would deny those allies that so desire the ability to operate beyond this region if and when they believe it to be necessary. Indeed, one of the unique strengths of the Alliance is that it provides a solid foundation for joint military action by some or all allies in defense of their territory, values, and interests wherever such action they deem appropriate.

Of the many issues relating to the threat and use of force by NATO that have divided the allies, none have been as contentious as the so-called mandate question, i. At the outset of this debate, most allies believed that NATO should not act in this type of situation without an explicit mandate or authorization from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter.

The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace Article At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively Article 51 and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Article The former situation falls squarely within the collective defense commitment of the Washington treaty; the latter, as the case of Bosnia demonstrated, follows logically from the right of collective self-defense.

That is the import of both Article 2 which prohibits the use force against the territory or political independence of another state and the proviso of Article 52 which limits action by regional arrangements such as NATO to those that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It follows from this reasoning that NATO can only use force in non-Article 5 contingencies either if it is invited to do so by the state involved or if it is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council.

That, after all, remains a major French objective. And in occupying one of five permanent member seats on the UN Security Council, Paris naturally has an interest in enhancing the role and authority of that body. But there are more substantial reasons for U. Indeed, since both countries want to avoid setting the precedent that NATO or any other organization or groupings of states can intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and if such intervention were to be conditioned on UN approval, either or both of the states is bound to use its veto in the Security Council to prevent forceful NATO action.

As a result, the insistence on a UN mandate implies that the type of behavior Europe has witnessed in the Balkans during the last decade, including the widespread abuse of human rights and denial of fundamental freedoms, would go effectively unpunished or undeterred. Given this practical reality, the United States favors leaving the decision on whether or not to use force up to the organization that would be responsible for undertaking such action—in this case to NATO. The Clinton Administration has argued that if nineteen democracies deem the threat or use of force necessary to right a specific wrong, then that fact in and of itself provides sufficient justification and legitimacy for the contemplated action.

No country would accept constraints on its freedom to act on behalf of its own interests in the manner and at a time it judges best. It argues that the same should be true for any organization of democratic states that acts on the basis of consensus. It was not until the crisis in Kosovo erupted in that the NATO allies were confronted with the practical implications of what had been up to that point a largely theoretical argument.

By early fall, the Alliance was forced to consider whether to threaten significant air strikes against Serbia, a sovereign country in the middle of Europe engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians in the province of Kosovo. France and others argued that NATO, as a defensive alliance, could not act in situations other than self-defense unless the action was explicitly authorized by the United Nations.

Always hesitant about using military force, Bonn was particularly cautious in staking out a new position in the run-up to the October Kosovo decision given that elections in late September had brought to power a new, center-left government.

Aside from these theoretical differences, the Alliance also faced a practical complication. After an agonizing series of diplomatic discussions and last-minute reports of a possible diplomatic breakthrough, the North Atlantic Council voted on October 13, , to activate NATO forces and authorize its supreme commander to commence air strikes following a ninety-six hour delay.

The Serbs had also clearly violated the Geneva Convention on warfare. What proved decisive for many allies, however, was not that NATO under these circumstances could mandate itself to act, but rather the belief that the humanitarian crisis inside Kosovo could not be prevented without forceful action.

There may be moments in which it is necessary to act for humanitarian reasons, when a UN Security Council resolution will not be necessary or will not be even appropriate because the UN charter does not contemplate humanitarian acts.

Despite having taken this decision, the NATO allies remain divided over whether Kosovo set a precedent for the future. Where does this leave the Alliance? In principle, NATO may embark on non-Article 5 missions without the consent of the government s involved only if its actions enjoy the authorization of the UN Security Council.

In practice, however, limiting NATO to those actions that have been approved by the Security Council could subject the Alliance to an effective veto by China or Russia. For this reason, NATO should not bind itself to a position that bars action in non-Article 5 contingencies if UN approval is not forthcoming. At the same time, although consensus among nineteen democratic states does provide a certain degree of legitimacy, the notion that NATO may arrogate the legal right to intervene in conflicts against the will of the government concerned is unsustainable.

Of course, in view of the lack of consensus within NATO on when and how to intervene, the point may well be moot. Nevertheless, the use or threat of force ought to have a legal basis sound enough to be acceptable both to NATO publics and to the vast majority of the international community. This approach recognizes that the authority to act in difficult cases may not be viewed in precisely the same way by every NATO member state, some of which may embrace a right of humanitarian intervention in response to gross violations of human rights or genocide, while others may require at least some relevant Security Council resolution short of express authorization e.

Constructive ambiguity can thus allow agreed action to occur at a time when legal norms regarding the use of force in situations other than self-defense are still evolving.

This raises the question whether an agreed legal foundation can be found to provide an appropriate basis for the possible use of force by NATO in non-Article 5 contingencies. One answer is that the provisions of three key documents to which all NATO members are signatories could furnish such a basis. The Charter of Paris, in particular, could supply the foundation on which to build a solid legal basis for NATO action in non-Article 5 situations, including the threat or use of military force, at least in cases involving genocide and or other serious violations of human rights.

To be sure, this document, like the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, affirms the principle of non-use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state.

Of course, determining whether such an extreme violation has occurred will always remain subject to differing interpretations among the allies.

Nevertheless, if and when a NATO of at least nineteen democratic states can agree that such a violation has occurred and forceful action is deemed necessary, then such action could be judged to be legitimate. In short, an agreed legal basis along these lines would enable the Alliance to take such action as it sees fit in cases of threats to or breaches of international peace and security involving gross violations of the human rights principles that are articulated in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and further refined in the Charter of Paris.

On the one hand, the Atlantic Alliance has weathered the end of the cold war and emerged as the premier security organization in Europe. Its members—old and new alike—have yet to fully agree on what a military organization born and raised in response to an overwhelming military threat emanating from the Soviet Union ought to do now that this threat has disappeared. Nowhere is this difference of purpose more apparent than in regard to the issue of when and how NATO should use force.

At the same time, some of these differences are more apparent than real, often a matter of style rather than substance. And in each case, reasonable compromises that are consistent with most points of view can be developed. Instead, a middle ground must and most likely will be found. The allies can achieve this purpose in part by holding open the door to Alliance membership to any European states that both desires to join and has made the necessary political, economic, and military reforms.

But it also means that the Alliance must become a key instrument in promoting the values and interests that set Europe apart from other regions in the world—including support for democracy and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

NATO brings to this task the unquestioned ability to deploy and use overwhelming military force. The threat of its use is often sufficient to ensure that states in Europe respect the norms, values, and codes of conduct governing their behavior to their citizens and neighbors alike.

Sometimes, however, more than threats are required, and NATO has demonstrated in the Balkans that it is willing to use force in order to promote security and stability throughout the region.

Specifically, the Alliance could increasingly view the threat or use of force not only in terms of providing a credible deterrent and defense of allied territory, but also as a critical tool for helping to enforce the norms, values, and code of conduct that govern behavior within and between states in the Euro-Atlantic region.

This would include the kind of operations NATO has conducted in the Balkans during the past years—including threatening force to protect civilian populations in Bosnia, deploying troops to help enforce peace agreements in Bosnia and, soon, in Kosovo , and conducting air strikes to force recalcitrant parties to seek a peaceful solution to conflict as happened in Bosnia and may still happen in Kosovo.

The Alliance is not today—and is unlikely to become any time soon—an appropriate instrument for using force outside of Europe. Its focus and planning horizon should therefore remain on Europe. Finally, whenever possible, NATO should threaten or use force with the full backing of the international community, as expressed by the UN Security Council.

The draft interim agreement for Kosovo stipulates that the UN be invited to endorse a NATO-led peace operation to support implementation of such an agreement. At the same time, the Alliance cannot be held hostage to the whims and fortunes of non-NATO members, including potential Russian or Chinese vetoes. As an alliance of democratic states acting on the basis of consensus, NATO must maintain the possibility of acting without specific UN authorization.

Even then, the allies should strive to act only on the basis of appropriate legal instruments, including the UN Charter and, for actions in Europe, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The latter, in particular, provides a sound and solid legal foundation for threatening or using force in cases where human rights or fundamental freedoms are being denied.

In sum, NATO enters the next century as the only major security organization that is capable of wielding significant military force in Europe. Canada's participation in NATO operations around the world exemplifies our commitment to the Alliance. NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. It promotes democratic values and is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

The coordinated and deliberate drawdown of all US and RSM forces is due to be completed within a few months. NATO Allies and partners will continue to support the ongoing Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process after the withdrawal of troops. He has also served as high commissioner to Kenya to ; as director general for International Organizations, Human Rights and Democracy to , for International Organizations to and for Africa to ; and as high commissioner to Nigeria to Angell was the G8 deputy personal representative to and personal representative to for Africa and, as such, a principal organizer of the and G8 summits at Kananaskis and Muskoka.

He has served at the United Nations to as alternate representative on the UN Security Council to , before which he was the advisor to General John de Chastelain on the International Body on the decommissioning of arms and the Multi-Party Negotiations on Northern Ireland Angell has also served at the embassy in Washington, D.

Lieutenant-General Frances J. She was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General in July All news. Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.