How much did sdi cost

Anatoly Dobrynin an advance copy of the speech announcing SDI. In an interview only a few days after the announcement, Reagan insisted that SDI was not part of a new arms race but instead a path to ridding the world of nuclear weapons altogether. The announcement of SDI shocked officials around the globe.

To many, it was as unexpected as it was provocative. Decades before, the two superpowers had successfully developed intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs as well as effective second strike capabilities such as nuclear submarines.

These weapons would be very difficult to destroy, even in a preemptive nuclear strike, and thus the Americans and the Soviets reached a certain equilibrium. Neither country could attack the other without the strong probability that both sides would be annihilated. What about stealth bombers? What about the ABM Treaty? What about our allies and the strategic doctrine on which we and they depend?

Another common criticism of SDI was that it was simply not a feasible project. There's no statesmanship in science fiction. Scientists also expressed their doubts about SDI. No more, no less. And the answer, to the best of my judgment, is yes. It is technically feasible. Caption: Graffiti in West Germany, "No star wars! Stop SDI! Despite its many critics, the Strategic Defense Initiative was ultimately very popular with the American public.

It appealed both to the desire for security against nuclear war and to the belief in the superiority of American technological achievements. Political scientist Kerry L. Hunter explained this phenomenon:. It did not matter that Star Wars ignored reality. In fact, it was for this reason that the ideal was so appealing. The Star Wars dream allowed Americans to avoid a very stark truth that was practically intolerable to face: there was nothing they could do to protect themselves from nuclear annihilation outside of cooperating with the Soviets Rhodes Polling data from the s supports this notion.

Caption: An artist's depiction of SDI. Scientific experts had not made any groundbreaking discoveries in the years leading up to the announcement of SDI, and they were far from certain whether such a system was even possible. Scientific development did not influence policy in this case; it was policy that was intended to influence science. The role of the organization, however, remained largely unclear. The actual design of SDI was also unclear; scientists and experts considered an enormous number of possibilities.

Options included both space-based and ground-based lasers, as well as a wide variety of missiles and tracking systems. Edward Teller, for example, was an early proponent of the satellite X-ray laser, although it was ultimately ineffective.

The Strategic Defense Initiative was ultimately most effective not as an anti-ballistic missile defense system, but as a propaganda tool which could put military and economic pressure on the Soviet Union to fund their own anti-ballistic missile system.

This possibility was particularly significant because, during the s, the Soviet economy was teetering on the brink of disaster. Although Reagan was sincerely invested in SDI for the purposes of national security and never intended for it to be a bargaining chip, many of his advisors acknowledged its potential as a negotiating tool. Caption: A Soviet artist's depiction of the Terra ground-based laser. Soviet scientists were immediately tasked with investigating SDI. What we were most afraid of?

Soviet research into anti-ballistic missiles had begun in the s, well before Reagan announced SDI, but it was quickly made a top priority in Above all else, Soviet leaders feared that SDI would pave the way for weaponizing space. The high point of Soviet anti-ballistic missile efforts came on May 15, , when they launched an Energia rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome launch site in southern Kazakhstan. The rocket carried the Polyus spacecraft, which was equipped with a laser system, Skif, and a missile system, Kaskad.

Pinsker, however, claims the technology was feasible—if given enough time to develop. Navy is placing lasers on its ships and has used them in exercises to take out drones and boats in military exercises. Of course this is now. In the s, that kind of technology was rudimentary.

Still, Pinsker argues, that was the point of Reagan's initiative—to grind away at the research until the concept became feasible. It didn't happen overnight with either, and both were incredibly expensive.

Artist's concept of interceptor under development for US Army's High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor, a key element of SDI's plan, in sub-launched scenario in which the US could defend from submarine-launched ballistic missile attacks.

Partisan debate on the issue had Democrats in Congress questioning the viability of the program, with Louisiana Senator J. Bennett Johnston calling it "absolute folly" and some scientists and members of the media describing SDI as a bargaining chip or bluff.

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